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CASE COMMENTS

Copyright - Renewal Rights - Executor's Right to
Renew Where Author Has Assigned Renewal Rights
During the original copyright term and prior to the renewal
period, the co-composer of the song Moonlight and Roses assigned
his copyright renewal rights to P. The author had no wife or child.
His next of kin were three brothers, each of whom executed a
like assignment to P. Before expiration of the original term, the
author died leaving a will which contained no specific bequest concerning the copyright renewal. His residuary estate was left to
his nephews and nieces. One of the brothers qualified as executor
of the will and in such capacity renewed the copyright for another
twenty-eight year term. The probate court decreed distribution
of the renewal copyright to the residuary legatees and D obtained
assignments from them. P, a music publisher, sued D, another
music publisher, for infringement of rights. D's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed. P brought certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, affirmed. The Copyright Act treats renewal rights as expectancies until the renewal period arrives at
which time the renewal rights vest in one of the four classes of
statutory beneficiaries enumerated in the act, and assignees of
renewal rights take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest
in their assignors. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc.,
80 Sup. Ct. 792 (1960).
In the United States a statutory copyright exists for a term
of twenty-eight years from the date of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1952). This original term can be renewed for another twentyeight year term when application by the proper party is made within
one year prior to the expiration of the original term. The right to
obtain a renewal copyright and the renewal copyright itself exist
only by reason of the Copyright Act and such rights are derived
solely and directly from the act, having no existence apart from it.
Fox Filn Corp. v. Knowles, 261 U.S. 326 (1922).
In a discussion dealing with renewal rights, renewal term,
and renewal period, a distinction must be observed in the use of
these terms. Renewal term refers to the second twenty-eight year
period which follows the original copyright term; renewal period
refers to the one year period prior to the expiration date of the
original term and during which application for the renewal must
be made; renewal right pertains to the right granted by section 24
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of the Copyright Act to four classes of beneficiaries who can
apply for the copyright renewal. Brown, Renewal Rights in Copyright, CORNELL L.Q. 460, 468 (1943).
Section 24 provides that the author (or the proprietor in some
instances) if still living is exclusively entitled to a renewal of the
copyright when he complies with the requirements of application.
17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952). If the author is not alive upon accrual
of the renewal period then the right to apply goes to "the widow,
widower, or children of the author." If in turn they be not living
then the right goes to the author's executor, or in the absence of a
will to his next of kin. Section 24 thus provides that the renewal
right may be exercised only by one of the four enumerated classes:
1) the author if living; 2) the widow, widower, or children; 3)
the author's executor; or 4) in the absence of a will, the author's
next of kin. In Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Co., 318
U.S. 643 (1943), it was held that an assignment by an author of
his renewal rights made before the original copyright expired is
binding against the author who was living at the time renewal rights
accrued. In such a case, the assignee would be precluded from
applying for the copyright renewal in his own name since he is not
one of the four classes of statutory beneficiaries. Because the right
to apply is not assignable, but only the benefits of the renewal
term are assignable, the application must be made in the name of
the author who will hold legal title to the renewal copyright in
trust for the assignee. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 So. CAL. L. REv. 23, 34 (1955). If the author is living
during the renewal period, he alone has the exclusive right to
apply for the renewal copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952).
The interests granted to the four classes of beneficiaries by
section 24 are unequal and disparate. Each class takes in a strict
statutory scheme of succession regulated by the fulfillment of conditions precedent. The hierarchy of classes is as follows: first,
the author, if living, can renew for his own benefit, or by the Fisher
case, supra, for the benefit of his assignee; second the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author is not living, for their
own benefit; third, if the author died intestate, and there be no
surviving widow, widower, or children, then the author's next of
kin can renew for their own benefit; fourth, in the alternative of
the third class above, if the author died leaving a will, and no surviving widow, widower, or children, then the right to renew accrues
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to the executor. But in a case where the author has assigned his
renewal rights, for whose benefit does the executor renew, for the
benefit of the author's legatees or for the benefit of the author's assignee? The contention that the executor takes for his own benefit is not worthy of consideration. Does the executor receive the
renewal right cum onere of the testator's assignment, or does he
take as trustee for the author's legatees in spite of the prior assignment? This is the question presented by the principal case. The
majority opinion of the court in a five to four decision answers
this question in favor of the author's legatees.
The dissenting opinion at first glance appears deceptively strong,
and indeed, is not without merit concerned as it is with an attempt
to apply a modern interpretation consistent with present day public
policy to an antiquated section of the copyright code. However,
it appears that the dissent fails to give full realization to the controlling principle that the right to renew is not part of the author's
estate passing to the executor in his capacity as the author's personal representative, but instead renewal rights and the renewal copyright itself are independent of the author's rights at the time of
his death and exist only by reason of the Copyright Act, derived
solely and directly from it. Ballentine v. De Sylva, 226 F.2d 623,
627 (9th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). The renewal
term is separate and distinct from the original copyright; it is a
new grant of a property right to a statutory beneficiary and in
reality is not an extension of the original copyright. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 27 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. N.Y. 1939). In effect,
the renewal term is the law's second chance given to an author and
his family to profit from the fruits of his labor. Harris v. Coca
Cola Co., 73 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709
(1935); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,
42 F.Supp. 859 (S.D. N.Y. 1942).
In the usual case of ordinary succession an executor takes in
a representative capacity cum onere of the testator's obligations.
Fox Film Corp. v. Knowles, supra at 330. The reasoning of the
majority opinion, however, is that the executor is granted renewal
rights under the act not as the testator's personal representative,
but instead as a trustee of the author's legatees. The majority
opinion states that section 24 provides "special rules in derogation
of the usual rules of succession" when the author dies. Under this
view the executor takes as the statutory designee to carry out the
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testamentary wishes of the author. This view appears consistent
with the purposes of the statute to allow the author to reap the
benefits of his labor if still living, or if not living, then the author's
wife or children, or if they be not living, then whomsoever the
author designates by will, or if no will, then the author's next of
kin. H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). In
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247, 253 (1st Cir.
1911), the court in commenting upon the intent of Congress stated
that the exclusion of the administrator from the statutory scheme
of distribution was a "positive illustration of the fact that the intention of the committee was to provide, as a matter of public
policy, that the right of renewal should be personal, and that the
author, or those named as the persons in whom he is most concerned, should not in any way be cut off." (Emphasis added.)
The assignment, in the majority view, was a valid transfer
of a contingent renewal right, a mere expectancy, but when the
author died prior to the renewal period, the expectancy also died
and the assignment was defeated. The assignee, having no greater
interest than his assignor, and claiming under the assignor's interest,
no longer had any interest at the moment of the assignor's death
when the assignor's interest failed.
However logical and consistent the majority opinion may be,
still the effect of the decision is to seriously curtail the value of
an author's renewal rights since publishers wil not be willing to
invest too heavily on the contingencies of an author's survival until
the renewal period. As the dissent points out, the effect of such
decision is to enable an author who has sold his renewal rights to
defeat the assignment by a deliberate subsequent bequest of those
rights to others in his will and then dying before the renewal period
arrives. Although there are several safeguards a purchaser of renewal expectancies may observe, still these precautions cannot fully
insure the obtaining of the renewal right. See Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1027, 1032 (1958). Today, public policy would seem to
favor the freedom of assignability over the obsolescent policy expressed by Congress in 1909 in section 24 to protect the author
from his assumed inability to protect himself regarding business
matters. There is no longer any need to protect the modem author
as a ward of the government. Today, authors are often well advised of their rights by business managers, agents, attorneys, and
others. It would appear, however, that the dissent's method of
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modernizing the statute by judicial interpretation would be inconsistent with the statute itself and the principle of stare decisis, and
that any revising of the Copyright Act is up to Congress.
John James McKenzie

Damages

-

Collateral Source Rule

P, a soldier, was severely injured in a collision between the
vehicle which he was driving and a vehicle being towed by D, and
was taken to an army hospital for care and treatment. D timely
objected to the attempted recovery by P of the reasonable value
of the hospital and medical services on the grounds that P had
personally paid nothing therefor and that the United States had
borne the expenses thereof. Held, following the so-called "modem
rule," that P could recover the reasonable value of medical and
hospital services rendered him without charge by virtue of such
services being considered a part of his compensation from the
United States. Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 186 F.Supp. 331
(D.C. N.D. 1960).
The principal case is a recent example of the modem application of the collateral source rule, without mentioning the rule as
such. In terse terms the rule is that a defendant who has negligently
injured another owes full compensation for the injuries inflicted,
and payment for these injuries from a collateral source in no way
relieves the defendant of his obligation. Burks v. Webb, 199 Va.
296, 99 S.E.2d 629 (1957). Generally, the application of the
rule can be divided into three areas: 1) where the plaintiff receives compensation under contracts of employment or insurance
policies; 2) where the plaintiff receives wages or medical services
which are gratuitously rendered; 3) where the plaintiff has received
compensation under workmen's compensation acts or similiar social
legislation. The prevailing rule in the United States seems to be
that an injured person may recover from the defendant that which
he receives under all three areas of the rule. Standard Oil of California v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), affd, 332
U.S. 301 (1947). However, different jurisdictions vary in their
adoption of the rule. Some states allow recovery under the first
and third areas, while refusing recovery under the second; therefore, it is necessary to consider each area separately.
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